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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, mobile phones have spread rapidly in many developed countries. In
the market for traditional mobile phones, there is just one network externality (network
eect), as has been recognized since the seminal work of Katz and Shapiro (1985).1
In addition to these standard mobile phones, smartphones, for example, the iPhone
from Apple, have recently increased their share and importance in our daily lives. Figure
1, for example, illustrates the market for smartphones in Japan.
Insert Figure 1 here.
One notable property of the smartphone market that diers from the market for
standard mobile phones is that it contains the following two externalities.
First, there is a network externality between carriers that has been considered in
the existing literature, such as Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Chen and Chen (2011).
According to this externality, a consumer who purchases a product or service from a
certain rm gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the same or dierent
product or service from the same rm. In Japan, for example, there are three major
carriers, NTT DoCoMo, KDDI, and Softbank, all of which provide some special services
that are mutually benecial for their respective customers.
Second, we should recognize the existence of another important network externality
between distinct types of smartphones supplied to dierent carriers by the same producer
of smartphone devices.2In the real world, for instance, a customer of a carrier who has
1In Belleamme and Peitz (2011, p.549 ), network eects has been formally dened as follows: \A
product is said to exhibit network eects if each user's utility is increasing in the number of other users
of that product or products compatible with it."
2In Kitamura (2013), I dene this externality as follows: \A consumer who purchases a product from
a certain rm gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the same product from the same
or dierent rm."
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Apple's iPhone gains a network benet when the number of iPhone users increases, even
when these users are customers of other carriers. This network benet takes the form
of enhancement of reputation about the iPhone, or an increase in complementary goods,
such as application software for the iPhone. Thus, even if consumers who use the iPhone
do not use the same carrier, all consumers gain a network benet from the increase in
the number of iPhone users. To the best of our knowledge, this externality has received
no attention in the previous studies that consider network externality.
In order to analyze such a market, one has to consider the idea of cannibalization.
Cannibalization means that a company reduces the sales of one of its products by intro-
ducing a similar, competing product in the same market. Although Katz and Shapiro
(1985) and Chen and Chen (2011) analyze the oligopolistic market in which each rm
supplies a single product, considering the real economy, there are oligopolistic markets
in which each rm produces and sells multiple products that are dierentiated vertically
in the same market. From each consumer's point of view, the quality of technology that
each rm uses to produce its goods is dierent. Therefore, each consumer places dierent
values on the high-quality goods of each rm. An example of this type of market is the
\beer-like" beverage market that emerged in Japan in 1994. This market is composed of
beer and happoshu or low-malt beer. (Happoshu) or low-malt beer is a tax category of
Japanese liquor that most often refers to a beer-like beverage with less than 67% malt
content. In the Japanese alcoholic-beverage tax system, lower tax is imposed on low-malt
beer than \beer" with more than 67% malt content. Consequently, the market price of
the former is lower than that of the latter. Therefore, leading makers such as Kirin, Asahi,
and Sapporo Breweries sell beer and low-malt beer brands in the same beer-like beverage
market. This market is not only horizontally but also vertically dierentiated. Similarly,
multi-product rms (abbreviated as \MPFs" hereafter) exist in the smartphone market.
For example, in Japan, both KDDI and Softbank supply Apple's iPhone and Google's
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Android smartphone. Although only Softbank supplied the iPhone initially, KDDI has
also adopted it recently. I illustrate the smartphone market with MPFs in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here.
Haruvy and Prasad (1998), a study closely related to mine, analyzed a market in which
a monopolist sells a high-end and low-end version of the same product. The authors
nd some conditions under which producing both goods is optimal in the market with
network externality. However, although each rm produces two dierentiated goods, the
two goods are sold in dierent markets, each with dierent types of consumers. In our
model, we assume that both goods are supplied to the same market.
Furthermore, the iPhone is made by only Apple (that is, vertical integration), but
Google's smartphones are made by many dierent producers. That is, Google only sup-
plies the Android platform, and when the platform is updated, each producer must x
the programming of their product to apply the new platform programming. So, Android
smartphones have more bugs, as compared with Apple's iPhone. Therefore, even in the
smartphone market, there may exist vertical dierentiation in quality.3 Thus, in the real
world, there may be many MPFs that dierentiate their goods not only horizontally but
also in quality, in the same market.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents
the model. Sections 3 and 4 prove and discuss the main results. Section 5 provides the
conclusion.
3Another example of vertical dierentiation in this industry is conrmed by the following outcome of
Geekbench (the rst URL is for the iPhone and the second for Android smartphones). This shows that
the iPhone and Android smartphones dier in quality.
URL: http://browser.primatelabs.com/geekbench2/1030202
URL: http://browser.primatelabs.com/android-benchmarks
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2 The model
In this section, I analyze a duopolistic market in the smartphone service industry with
two kinds of network externalities. To pay attention to the externality between machines
or devices, I omit carriers' phone services charges, because carriers in Japan charge their
customers a xed communication services fee, including an installment plan for the smart-
phone.4
Suppose there are two rms, (i = 1; 2), each producing two goods (good H and
good L) that dier in terms of quality, where 1, 2 imply Firm 1 and Firm 2 in the
duopoly case, respectively. Let VH and VL denote the quality level of the two goods.
Then, the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay for each good is assumed to
be VH > VL > 0. Further, we assume VH = (1 + )VL, where  represents the dierence
in quality between the two goods. For simplicity, we normalize the quality of the low-
quality good as VL = 1. Good (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for any consumer.
For simplicity, suppose that each rm has no production and xed costs. Under these
assumptions, each rm's prot is dened as follows:
i = piHxiH + piLxiL i = 1; 2; (1)
where pi is the price of good  sold by rm i, and xi is the rm's output. Each rm
chooses the quantity to supply that maximizes this prot function in Cournot fashion.
Now, we describe the consumers' behavior in our model.
Following the standard specication in the literature{for example, Katz and Shapiro
(1985){we assume that there is a continuum of consumers that is characterized by a
taste parameter  that is uniformly distributed between  1 and r > 0 with density 1.
4Customers who use a smartphone from any carrier can practically use the call service free of charge
by using the software, \Line."
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It is assumed that a consumer of type  2 ( 1; r]; r > 0 obtains a net surplus from
one unit of good  of rm i at price pi. Furthermore, we assume that there exists
a network externality between carriers or a network externality between machines. The
former implies that a consumer who purchases a product or service from a certain rm
gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the same or dierent product from
the same rm. We dene the latter externality as follows: A consumer who purchases a
product from a certain rm gains a network benet when other consumers purchase the
same product, regardless of its carrier.
Then, the surplus of the consumer  who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2)
is given by5
Ui() = V + Vg
e
i   pi; i = 1; 2;  = H;L, (2)
where  represents the strength of the network externality. gei is the expectation of
network benet that a consumer obtains by purchasing one unit of good  from rm i.
More precisely, we assume that the function gei() is linear and dene gei as follows in
the two cases of network externality:
 Network externality between carriers
gei  gi(xeiH ; xeiL; xejH ; xejL; c)
= xeiH + x
e
iL + c(x
e
jH + x
e
jL)
= Xei + cX
e
j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j;  = H;L. (3)
Here, Xei = x
e
iH + x
e
iL and c is the degree of compatibility between carriers.
5This surplus is modeled similarly to Baake and Boom (2001).
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 Network externality between machines or devices
gei  gi(xeiH ; xeiL; xejH ; xejL; m)
= xe1 + x
e
2 + m(x
e
1 + x
e
2)
= Xe + mX
e
; ;  = H;L;  6= ; i = 1; 2. (4)
Here, Xe = x
e
1 + x
e
2 and m is the degree of compatibility between machines.
For simplicity, we assume that the parameter of the degree of compatibility in both
cases,  2 f0; 1g( = c;m) takes just 0 or 1. Thus, when the value of each parameter is
0 (1), it implies that consumers are incompatible (compatible) in each case.
We do not explicitly model the process through which consumers' expectations are
formed. However, we impose the requirement that in equilibrium, consumers' expecta-
tions are fullled. That is, we assume the following fullled expectations Cournot equi-
librium: when consumers form rational expectations, in equilibrium, the consumers' ex-
pected quantity is equal to actual quantity. Each rm chooses its output level under the
following assumptions:
(a) Consumers' expectations about the size of networks are given.
(b) The actual output level of the other rm is xed.
Assumption (b) is the standard Cournot assumption. Assumption (a) implies that in
this model, the rms are unable to commit themselves, so that only the output levels of
the fullled expectations Cournot equilibrium are credible announcements.
Furthermore, we assume that consumers must make their purchase decisions before
the actual network sizes are known. Thus, the timing of the game is as follows.
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1st Stage: Consumers form expectations about the size of the network with which each
rm is associated.
2nd Stage: The rms play an output game, taking consumers' expectations as given.
This game generates a set of prices. Consumers then make their purchase decisions by
comparing their reservation prices with the prices set by the two rms (i = 1; 2).
Each consumer determines to buy nothing, or one unit of the good , from rm i to
maximize his/her surplus.
Before deriving the inverse demand of each good, we assume that for an arbitrary
type- consumer,
U1() = U2();  = H;L. (5)
This assumption states that the net surplus from buying the good from rm 1 or rm 2
must be equal, as long as the two rms produce the good with the same quality and have
positive sales. From (2) and (5), we obtain
V^ + Vg
e
1   p1 = V^ + Vge2   p2
() p1   Vge1 = p2   Vge2: (6)
Here, p1   Vge1 = p2   Vge2 is the expected hedonic price of brand , that is,
the price adjusted for the network size. This hedonic price is used by Katz and Shapiro
(1985). Thus, I may let
p  p1   Vge1 = p2   Vge2;  = H;L. (7)
I assume that there exists a consumer who is indierent between the two goods of the
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same rm. This consumer's type is denoted by ^i. Then, we have
UiH

^i

= UiL

^i

> 0 (8)
() (1 + )^i + (1 + )geiH   piH = ^i + geiL   piL
() ^i = 1

fpiH   piL   ((1 + )geiH   geiL)g i = 1; 2: (9)
Equations (7) and (9) yield
^1 =
1

fp1H p1L ((1+)ge1H ge1L)g =
1
H   Lfp2H p2L ((1+)g
e
2H ge2L)g = ^2;
and therefore,
^1 = ^2:
So I may let
^  ^i i = 1; 2. (10)
Furthermore, as in the preceding chapter, we suppose that there exists a type of consumer
L, who is indierent between purchasing good L and purchasing nothing. Then, the
following equation holds:
UiL (L) = U2L (L) = 0
, L = piL   geiL: (11)
Then, from (2), (8), (11) and the increasing function of UiL(), we see that
UiH(^) = UiL(^) > U1L(L) = U2L(L) = 0:
9
So, equivalently we have
^ > L: (12)
Thus, as in the previous chapter, I obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Any consumer  2 ( 1; L) buys nothing, consumer  2 ( L; b) ( 2 [b; r])
buys good L (good H ), respectively.
2.1 Derivation of Equilibrium
From Lemma 1, we obtain the following system of equations:
8>><>>:
r   ^ = XH
r   L = XH +XL  x1H + x2H + x1L + x2L;
(13)
where X = x1 + x2;  = H;L.
Substituting (??) and (11) into these equations and solving them for piH and piL, the
inverse demand functions are obtained as8>><>>:
piH = (1 + )(r + g
e
iH  XH) XL
piL = r  XH  XL + geiL:
(14)
To maximize the prot function, each rm determines each quantity qiH and qiL, given
10
consumers' expectations,
max
qiH ;qiL
i:
Here, i = f(1 + )(r + geiH  XH) XLgxiH + (r  XH  XL + geiL)xiL from (1).
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization are
8>><>>:
@i
@xiH
=  (1 + )xiH + (1 + )(r + geiH  XH) XL   xiL = 0
@i
@xiL
=  xiH   xiL + r + ge1L  XH  XL = 0; i = 1; 2:
(15)
Furthermore, to guarantee positive quantities and downward-sloping demand in all
situations, we assume that
0 <  < 1 and 0 <  <
2
3  2 : (16)
From the rst-order condition (15), we have the following reaction functions for xiHand
xiL:
6
xiH =  
3  (1 + )@giH
@xiL
(1 + )(3   @giH
@xiH
)
xiL +
r
3   @giH
@xiH
; (17)
xiL =  
3   @giL
@xiH
3  @giL
@xiL
xiH +
r
3   @giL
@xiL
: (18)
 Case 1 (Network externality between carriers)
In this case of a network externality between carriers, we consider two extreme
settings: c = 0 and c = 1.
{ Case of full compatibility (c = 1)
6Then, we solve these reaction functions given by q1 = q2.
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From (3) and the assumption of fullled expectations, in equilibrium we have
gei = X
e
i +X
e
j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j. (19)
Thus, from the rst-order conditions (15),
8>><>>:
xFCiH =
r
3 2
xFCiL = 0:
(20)
Then, the equilibrium price is determined as follows:
pFCH =
r(1 + )
3  2 : (21)
{ Case of incompatibility (c = 0)
From (3) and the assumption of fullled expectations, in equilibrium we have
gei = X
e
i ; i;= 1; 2; . (22)
Thus, from the rst-order conditions (15),
8>><>>:
xICiH =
r
3 
xICiL = 0:
(23)
This leads to the following equilibrium price:
pICH =
r(1 + )
3   : (24)
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 Case 2 (Network externality between machines or devices)
As with Case 1, the following two settings can be considered.
{ Case of full compatibility (m = 1)
In equilibrium, we obtain
gei = X
e
H +X
e
L; . (25)
Thus, from the rst-order conditions (15),
8>><>>:
xFMiH =
r
3 2
xFMiL = 0:
(26)
Thus, the equilibrium price of good H is the same as in equation (21), that is,
pFMH =
r(1 + )
3  2 (27)
{ Case of incompatibility (m = 0)
Similarly, we have
gei = X
e
; ;= H;L: (28)
Thus, from the rst-order conditions (15),
8>><>>:
xIMiH =
rf(3 2) 2)g
(2 3)2+4( 3)
xIMiL =
 2(1+)r
(2 3)2+4( 3) :
(29)
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From equation (29), we can immediately nd that
xIMiH < x
IM
iL (30)
Now, we consider the point elasticity of rm demand  in this case as follows:
 =  @xi
@p
p
xi
;  = H;L: (31)
Then, from equation (29), we have H and L as follows:
H =
3  4   2
(3  2   2)(1  ) >
 (3  4   4)
2(1 + )(1  ) = L: (32)
Therefore, in equilibrium, each rm produces more low-quality goods L than
high-quality goods H, because the elasticity of demand of good L, that is, L,
is less than that of good H, that is, H . The equilibrium prices are8>><>>:
pIMH =
r(1+)(3 4 2)
(2 3)2+4( 3)
pIML =
r(3 4 4)
(2 3)2+4( 3) :
(33)
Furthermore, the eects of an increase in the quality of the high-quality good
on each quantity can be conrmed as follows:
8>><>>:
@xIMiH
@
=  6r(3 2)f(2 3)2+4( 3)g2 < 0;
@xIMiL
@
= 18rf(2 3)2+4( 3)g2 > 0:
(34)
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a network externality, not between carriers, but ma-
chines or devices. Then, an increase in the quality dierence between two goods leads
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to a decrease in the quantity of high-quality goods and an increase in that of low-quality
goods.
From the reaction functions (17) and (18), in this case @gi
@xi
= 0. This makes the
slope of the reaction functions steeper. Thus, if there is only the network externality
between machines and the two goods are incompatible, the competition between the two
dierentiated goods is very erce. However, an increase in the quality dierence between
the two goods () makes the slope of the reaction function (17) steeper and increases the
xiL-intercept of one in the xiH   xiL plane (the reaction function xiL(xiH) is unchanged).
Consequently, the increase in  makes the intersection points of the reaction functions
move toward the upper left in the xiH   xiL plane. Thus, the equilibrium output of the
high-quality good decreases and more of the low-quality good is produced. This is an
example of cannibalization, where the low-quality good L drives the high-quality good H
out of the market. That is, an increase in the quality dierence between the two goods
gives rise to relaxing competition in these goods. It also has a positive eect on the
equilibrium output of the low-quality goods; however, this change in the output of the
low-quality good leads to lower production of the high-quality good.
3 Relationships between equilibria
3.1 Comparison between Compatible and Incompatible Equi-
libria
In this section, in each case, we compare two equilibrium outcomes: fully compatible and
incompatible equilibria.
 Case 1 (Network externality between carriers)
15
From (20) and (23), we have the following relations:
8>><>>:
xFCiH > x
IC
iH
xFCiL = x
IC
iL = 0
(35)
and
pFCH > p
IC
H : (36)
Furthermore, we also have
FCi > 
IC
i : (37)
Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When only a network externality between carriers exists, the prices
of both goods and the prot of each rm are higher in the compatible than in the
incompatible case.
This proposition is very natural and similar to results in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Furthermore, we can easily show that social welfare|dened as the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus|is also higher when the two rms are in the compatible
than in the incompatible case.
 Case 2 (Network externality between machines)
Similarly, from (26) and (29), we have the following relations:
8>><>>:
xFMiH > x
IM
iH
xIMiL > x
FM
iL = 0
(38)
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and
pFMH > p
IM
H ; (39)
FMi > 
IM
i : (40)
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When only a network externality between machines exists, the price
of the high-quality good is higher in the compatible case, as compared to the incom-
patible case. Furthermore, the prot of each rm is always higher when the two
goods are in the compatible than in the incompatible case.
The quantity of the low-quality good decreases when there is a change from the in-
compatible to the fully compatible case under two goods. In spite of this, the relationship
between prots under fully compatible and incompatible equilibria is the same as in Katz
and Shapiro's (1985) model (Case 1).
3.2 Comparison between Case 1 and Case 2
Finally, we explore the dierences in case 1 and case 2 with respect to quantity, price,
and prot. From the previous subsection, we nd the following relations:
8>><>>:
xFMiH = x
FC
iH > x
IC
iH > x
IM
iH
xIMiL > x
FM
iL = x
FC
iL = x
IC
iL = 0
(41)
and
pFMH = p
FC
H > p
IC
H > p
IM
H ; (42)
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8>><>>:
FMi = 
FM
i > 
IC
i > 
IM
i if  < ^
FMi = 
FM
i > 
IM
i > 
IC
i if ^ < ;
(43)
where ^ satises (   2)(2   3)2^+ 4(1  )(3  ) = 0.7
Proposition 4Making the carriers or machines compatible always increases the quan-
tity, price of the high-quality goods, and prots of both rms. Furthermore, each rm sells
more and sets a higher price for high-quality goods when the two carriers are incompat-
ible, than when the two machines are incompatible. However, if the dierence in the
quantity of the two goods is large enough, the rms earn more when the two machines are
incompatible, than when the two carriers are incompatible.
This implies that it is better for both rms to compete in a market in which there
exists only a network externality between machines and even produce the low-quality
good, if the dierence in the quality of the two goods is too large. This is because if
 is large enough, then both rms are better-o producing the low-quality good from
proposition 1; they benet by selling more of the low-quality good when the two goods
are incompatible. Thus, in this case, the two rms sell more of their low-quality goods
and decrease the output of high-quality goods; that is, cannibalization occurs.8
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we compare social welfare in each case. The social surplus in the equilib-
rium derived in the preceding section is given by
7We can easily conrm that ^ satises both positive quantities and the downward-sloping demand
condition (16) as follows: 0 < ^ < 2=(3  2).
8We showed that cannibalization occurs in the market without the network externality when the
rm has some production cost, in Kitamura and Shinkai (2014). However, in the market with network
externality between machines, cannibalization occurs even when there is no production cost.
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W  =
Z ^
L
( + giL)d +
Z r
^
f(1 + ) + giHgd: (44)
 Case 1 (Network externality between carriers) The social welfare in equilibrium of
the full compatibility case (c = 1) and incompatible case (c = 0) is, respectively,
W FC =
4(1 + )r2
(3  2)2 ; (45)
W IC =
4(1 + )r2
(3  )2 :
From (46), when there is only the network externality between carriers, achieving
complete compatibility improves social welfare, that is,
W FC > W IC (46)
 Case 2 (Network externality between machines) The social welfare in equilibrium of
the full compatibility case (m = 1) and incompatible case (m = 0) is, respectively,
W FM =
4(1 + )r2
(3  2)2 ; (47)
W IM =
2r2(2v   1)(1 + u)
f(2   3)2+ 4(   3)g2f2(3  2)
33 (48)
2(3  2)(162   32 + 9)2
( 803 + 2362   132   9)
 4(82   21 + 3)g:
Similar to the previous case 1, in this case too, compatibility between two devices
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is better from the social surplus viewpoint. That is,
W FM > W IM (49)
Proposition 5 Complete compatibility is always socially optimal, regardless of which
network externality|between carriers or machines|exists.
This result is similar to Katz and Shapiro (1985). That is, if the rm does not have
any production cost or costs for compatibility, the social welfare in full compatibility
equilibrium always exceeds that in incompatibility equilibrium. In case 1, both rms
produce only high-quality goods, in spite of carrier compatibility. On the other hand, in
case 2, each rm sells both goods when two devices are incompatible. This proposition
implies that only high-quality goods survive when the market is socially optimal.
Finally, for social welfare, we compare case 1 and case 2. By the equations (46) and
(48), we nd that
8>><>>:
W FC = W FM > W IC > W IM if  and  are not too high
W FC = W FM > W IM > W IC if  and  are too high:
(50)
This is shown in Figure 3.(Figure 3 represents W IC  W IM .)
Insert Figure 3 here.
5 Concluding Remarks
Extending Katz and Shapiro's (1985) model, this paper has theoretically analyzed rm
behavior and the resulting market conguration in the smartphone industry.
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In section 2, we constructed a duopoly model where two rms sell two dierentiated
products and there is a network externality between either carriers or machines. We then
derived proposition 1 that highlights the eects of a change in the quality of goods on
the quantity of each good. Here, we also mentioned cannibalization. In section 3, we
tried to compare fully compatible and incompatible equilibria. The equilibrium output of
the low-quality good is produced only if there is a network externality between machines
and the two machines are incompatible. Furthermore, we nd that in both cases, there
is only a network externality between carriers and machines; and the quantity of the
high-quality good, prices of the two goods, and prot of each rm are higher when the
carriers or goods are compatible rather than incompatible. Finally, in this section, we
considered the dierences in the two kinds of network externalities. Then, we showed
that as long as the dierence in the quantity of the the two goods is too large, the two
rms make more prot when the two machines are incompatible, than when both carriers
are incompatible.
In section 4, we conducted welfare analysis and found that, in both cases, complete
compatibility is always socially optimal. Furthermore, if the dierence in the quantity of
two goods and the strength of the network externality are too large, social welfare in the
incompatible case where only the network externality between machines exists exceeds
that in the case of the network externality between carriers only.
However, we have so far focused on only the downstream market. Therefore, we will
extend this analysis to include the upstream market. Furthermore, in this study, we
considered a duopoly model without production cost. Thus, future studies must analyze
the case where rms have some production costs, including the costs of making carriers
or machines compatible.
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Appendix: Lemma 1
Proof : By equation (2) and (8), for arbitrary type  > ^i, From (2) and (12), we also
have, for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b);
UiL(b)  UiL(L) = ^ + geiL   pL   (L + geiL   pL)
= ^   L > 0:
UiH()  UiL() = (1 + ) + (1 + )geiH   piH      geiL + piL
=    fpiH   piL   ((1 + )geiH   geiL)g
> ^i   fpiH   piL   ((1 + )geiH   geiL)g
= 0:
From (2) and (12), we also have, for arbitrary type  2 ( L; b);
UiL(b)  UiL(L) = ^ + geiL   piL   (L + geiL   piL)
= ^   L > 0:

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